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JOHN A. LIEKWEG, ESQUIRE
INTRODUCTION
The subject of tax exemption and racial discrimination is a familiar
one for this group, having been on the agenda at the 1976 and 1980 Di-
ocesean Attorneys Meetings.' Recent significant developments, in particu-
lar the administration's proposed legislation to amend section 501 of the
Internal Revenue Code to preclude tax-exempt status for private schools
that discriminate on the basis of race, require that once again this contro-
versial subject be analyzed and discussed. It is important to note at this
point that the United States Catholic Conference has not taken a position
on the legislation. This presentation is intended primarily to identify is-
sues, not to provide answers or make recommendations.
BACKGROUND
Before addressing the issues it would be useful to bring you up to
date on recent developments. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), spurred by Green v. Connally,' announced that it would no longer
recognize racially discriminatory private schools as exempt under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.3 Subsequently, in a series of rev-
enue rulings and procedures, the IRS made it clear that religious schools,
and churches operating schools that do not accept students on the basis
See Liekweg, Relationship of Civil Rights Issues to Education and Taxation, 26 CATH.
LAW. 186, 186-97 (1981); Rumph, Revenue Procedure on Racial and Ethnic Discrimination
in Schools, 22 CATH. LAW. 209, 209-18 (1976).
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). The district
court provided an overview of the litigation prior to the 1971 decision. 330 F. Supp. at 1155-
56. The court held that racially discriminatory private schools are not entitled to a tax ex-
emption and persons making gifts to such schools are not entitled to deductions. Id. at 1179-
80.
3 330 F. Supp. at 1156 & n.3.
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of race do not qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3). 4 In 1978, the
IRS, again spurred by litigation,5 published a proposed revenue procedure
ostensibly intended to provide more effective guidelines for identifying
private schools that discriminate.6 The proposed procedure met with a
storm of protests from a broad range of representatives of private educa-
tion, and was revised by the IRS in 1979, but was never finalized nor
implemented because of provisions enacted by Congress during the past
several years as part of appropriations legislation.
As this controversy developed, Goldsboro Christian Schools7 and Bob
Jones University8 were working their way up to the United States Su-
preme Court. Both of those cases involved disputes with the IRS over
discriminatory policies based on religious beliefs. In Goldsboro Christian
Schools, an admissions policy is at issue, while in Bob Jones University, a
policy against interracial dating is involved. In both cases the IRS' refusal
to recognize the school as exempt was upheld by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In October, 1981, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in both cases.9
On January 8, 1982, the United States Treasury Department an-
nounced that, without further guidance from Congress, the IRS would no
longer revoke or deny exempt status for religious, charitable, educational,
or scientific organizations on the ground that they do not conform to cer-
tain fundamental public policies, specifically mentioning the policy
against racial discrimination. 0 The announcement stated that the change
in position reflected the advice of the Department of Justice that the au-
thority previously asserted by the IRS as its basis for revoking the tax
exemptions of certain schools was supported by neither the language of
the Code nor its legislative history. On the same day, the Department of
Justice advised the Supreme Court that the Treasury Department had
initiated steps to reinstate the exempt status of Goldsboro Christian
Schools and Bob Jones University and asked the Court to vacate the
judgments of the Fourth Circuit.
Predictably, the government's announcement of its change in policy
4 E.g., Rev. Rul. 447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Rul. 231, 1975-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Proc. 72-54,
1972-2 C.B. 834; Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
6 Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
6 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296-98 (1978); Liekweg, supra note 1, at 194.
' Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
o Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892
(1981).
I Both cases have been carried over to the Supreme Court's docket. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3021
(U.S. Aug. 3, 1982) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3).
" N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
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generated an enormous amount of public controversy. In response, on
January 18, President Reagan sent to Congress proposed legislation in-
tended to give the IRS express authority to deny exempt status to private
educational organizations with racially discriminatory policies. Of partic-
ular inteiest to religious schools is that the legislation is not intended to
apply to seminaries and Sunday schools, and would allow other religious
or church-related schools to give preferences or priorities to members of
their own religion, provided the policy is not based upon race or a belief
that requires discrimination based upon race. Limited hearings have been
held in both the House and the Senate, but it is unlikely that the legisla-
tion will move very rapidly.
In another somewhat surprising development, last February the Jus-
tice Department asked the Supreme Court to hear the two cases but indi-
cated that the Court should appoint special counsel to argue the govern-
ment's position that discriminatory schools do not qualify for exemption
under section 501(c)(3). On April 19, the Supreme Court invited William
T. Coleman, former Secretary for the Department of Transportation, to
brief and argue the cases, as amicus curiae, in support of the Fourth Cir-
cuit judgments.
POLICY AGAINST RACISM-NATIONAL POLICY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
In analyzing legislation of this kind, it is important to keep in mind
the Church's teaching on racial discrimination as well as the national pol-
icy against racial discrimination. The Catholic Church in this country has
consistently maintained that the heart of the race question is moral and
religious and that discrimination based upon race, language, religion or
national origin is contrary to right, reason and Christian teaching.11 Re-
garding education, the Church has long recognized that education is a
basic need and that quality education for the poor, especially minorities
who have been traditionally victims of discrimination, is a moral impera-
tive. 2 The Church's commitment to equal educational opportunity in
both public and nonpublic schools, including its own is well established.
The federal government also has a well-established policy against ra-
cial discrimination, although its perimeters are not precisely defined. The
policy is reflected in a number of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
provisions, the application of which can vary substantially depending
upon the nature of the discrimination being proscribed, discouraged or
remedied. To illustrate, the Supreme Court has made clear in a series of
" National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Brothers and Sisters To Us-U.S. Bishops'
Pastoral Letter on Racism In Our Day (1979).
" See National Conference of Catholic Bishops, To Teach as Jesus Did-U.S. Bishops'
Pastoral Message on Catholic Education (1973).
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cases that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment pro-
hibits only invidious intentional discrimination by governmental bodies
or officials. 3 At the same time, the Court has recognized that Congress
through legislation can proscribe or penalize acts that have the effect of
discriminating, albeit unintentionally.' Respectively, these shall be re-
ferred to as the "intent standard" and the "effects standard." In addition,
affirmative action or nondiscrimination requirements attach to participa-
tion in almost every conceivable federal program.
In enacting legislation, it is important that it be made clear what
kind of discriminatory activity is being addressed and what is to be ex-
pected of the affected schools. While the Church's position on racism and
the federal government's policy against racial discrimination are consis-
tent, the Church must be ever vigilant to assure that in furthering its
policy the government does not unreasonably interfere with or burden the
Church's legitimate governmental activities.
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISCRIMINATION
One of the critical issues in the proposed legislation is the standard
to be used in determining discrimination. Will only intentional discrimi-
nation be prohibited or will acts that have a disproportionate impact or
effect on minorities also be prohibited? The recent experience with the
1978 proposed procedure accentuates the need for clear and reasonable
standards in any legislation addressing the issue of racial discrimination
in private schools.
Adoption of an effects standard could have a substantial impact on
the operations of private schools. A few examples should suffice to illus-
trate the potential impact. The absence of a bilingual program, or the
adoption of a particular type of language program could adversely affect
the enrollment or participation of non-English speaking children in a
school. Admissions tests and ability grouping tests may have a dispropor-
tionate effect on certain racial and ethnic groups. Giving preference to
members of a particular religion or parish could result in low minority
enrollment in a school. These situations can arise for legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons.
An intent standard on the other hand, is not likely to affect the oper-
See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977) ("substantial underrepresenta-
tion of a group constitutes a constitutional violation ... if it results from [the state's] pur-
poseful discrimination"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("The central pur-
pose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of
official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.").
" See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976) (title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 has a more stringent test for violation of equal protection than that required
under the Constitution).
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ations of nondiscriminatory schools and is consistent with the Constitu-
tion's prohibition against invidious intentional discrimination and the
Church's position condemning racism as sinful. An effects standard could
also be said to be consistent with the Church's positions on equal educa-
tional opportunity and affirmative action.
AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES
An issue that must be addressed is what affirmative duties, if any,
should be required of exempt schools if legislation is enacted. Currently,
under Revenue Procedure 75-50, exempt private schools must meet cer-
tain requirements regarding adoption of a formal policy of nondiscrimina-
tion, publication and certification of that policy, and recordkeeping1
The 1978 proposed procedure raised concerns that private schools
might be required to engage in active and vigorous recruitment programs,
provide financial assistance to minority students, adopt special minority-
oriented curriculum, and appoint minority members to the governing
body of the school. While all or any of these kinds of actions are certainly
laudatory and indicate that a school does not discriminate, their absence
does not necessarily mean that a school does discriminate. It is readily
apparent that a mandatory requirement for some or all of the actions
could place a severe burden on religious schools. The potential for overly
burdensome regulatory requirements will have to be scrutinized carefully
in evaluating the proposed legislation.
EXTENT OF IRS INVOLVEMENT WITH PRIVATE SCHOOLS
Any legislation conditioning exempt status on a school's adherence to
a policy of racial nondiscrimination will inevitably lead to some interac-
tion between schools and the IRS. An important issue in the proposed
legislation is the extent of IRS authority to examine the activities of pri-
vate schools; that is, how and under what circumstances can the IRS de-
termine what a school's policies and practices are? The type and scope of
IRS inquiries can vary immensely, ranging from a simple telephone call to
an on-site examination.
In evaluating the proposed legislation, consideration will have to be
given to including safeguards reasonably designed to protect schools, par-
ticularly religious and church-related schools, from unreasonable inquiries
or harassment by the IRS. Limitations similar to those in effect for
churches under section 7605(c) of the Code could be considered. 6
' Rev. Proc. 50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, 587-89.
14 See I.R.C. § 7605(c) (1982). Section 7605(c) provides:
No examination of the books of account of a church or convention or association
of churches shall be made to determine whether such organization may be engaged in
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SHOULD EXEMPT STATUS DEPEND ON COMPLIANCE WITH NATIONAL
POLICY?
In the continuing controversy over tax exemptions for discriminatory
private schools a basic question underlying the whole issue has tended to
be overlooked: is it good policy to condition exempt status on compliance
with a national social policy? The concept has its difficulties.
Requiring all organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) to comply
with a particular social policy, assuming that the policy can be clearly
identified, would seem to undermine the diversity and pluralism that is
the strength of the private voluntary sector. From a practical standpoint,
adding another condition for qualification to section 501(c)(3) would fur-
ther complicate an already complicated section of the Code. The lobbying
and political activity restrictions in section 501(c)(3) have proved to be
controversial and difficult to administer and interpret. No less can be ex-
pected of a provision relating to racial discrimination. The addition of a
racial nondiscrimination requirement could lead to pressure to condition
exempt status on compliance with public policies against other forms of
discrimination. Moreover, to condition exempt status on compliance with
one social policy opens the door to requirements of compliance with
others. Once having adopted the concept, it may be difficult to contain.
On the other side, there is the argument that the federal government
should not provide any benefits at all to discriminatory schools, including
tax benefits, however indirect. In addition, there is the somewhat specula-
tive contention that the threat of loss of exempt status could have the
positive effect of inducing some schools to abandon discriminatory poli-
cies and thereby increase educational opportunities for minorities who
choose to enroll. Whether this basic policy question will receive serious
consideration during the legislative process remains to be seen.
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ATTACKING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The government's precise interest in proposing this legislation is to
ensure that the federal government does not provide any direct or indi-
rect assistance or benefits through the tax code to private schools that
the carrying on of an unrelated trade or business or may be otherwise engaged in
activities which may be subject to tax under part III of subchapter F of title 1 of this
title unless the Secretary . . . believes that such organization may be so engaged and
so notifies the organization in advance of the examination. No examination of the
religious activities of such an organization shall be made except to the extent neces-
sary to determine whether such organization is a church or a convention or associa-
tion of churches, and no examination of the books of account of such an organization
shall be made other than to the extent necessary to determine the amount of tax
imposed by this title.
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discriminate on the basis of race. The logical means of achieving this nar-
row interest is by amending the Internal Revenue Code. In this sense
there are no alternative approaches available outside the Code.
If the ultimate goal, however, is to eliminate discrimination in private
education, as arguably it should be, more direct and efficient means of
achieving this goal could be employed than denial of exempt status. For
example, through legislation a new private right of action could be cre-
ated to protect individuals against discrimination. Civil and criminal pen-
alties could be levied against schools that discriminate on the basis of
race. This could be a greater deterrent to the practice of racial discrimi-
nation than a denial of tax benefits.
In addition, there are other available means of attacking the problem
of racial discrimination in private schools. Presently, private schools that
discriminate on the basis of race are ineligible to receive federal financial
assistance under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 Private schools
are subject to Title VII's proscriptions against discrimination in employ-
ment practices.' 8 Private schools, including religious schools, with racially
discriminatory admissions policies have been held subject to compensa-
tory and injunctive relief under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.19
While the alternatives suggested above would more directly, and per-
haps more effectively, address the problem of racial discrimination, their
serious consideration under present circumstances may be difficult. The
controversy over tax exemptions for schools that discriminate has raged
for more than 10 years and the narrow focus has been on withdrawing tax
benefits from discriminatory schools.
PROS AND CONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S LEGISLATION
The legislation proposed by President Reagan would amend section
501 of the Code by adding a new subsection, (j), which provides that an
organization which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum,
other than an exclusively religious curriculum, and has a regularly en-
rolled body of students shall not be exempt from tax if the organization
has a racially discriminatory policy. In addition to denying exempt status
to organizations that operate schools with a racially discriminatory policy,
the legislation would also amend other sections of the Code to deny as
charitable deductions contributions to such organizations for individual
and estate and gift tax purposes.
The proposed legislation has both good and bad features. On the pos-
itive side it specifically recognizes the special concerns of religious schools
"7 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
38 See id. § 2000e.
19 Id.
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by allowing them to give preferences to members of their own religions. It
also is not intended to apply to exclusively religious schools such as semi-
naries and Sunday schools, and, thus, reduces the potential for govern-
mental involvement in purely religious matters. An additional positive
feature is that on its face it appears to address discriminatory policies
and practices rather than individual acts of discrimination that may be
isolated or aberrational.
On the negative side the proposed legislation is ambiguous in some
respects and does not contain any limitations on the extent of the IRS
authority to investigate religious schools. The use of the term "exclusively
religious curriculum" to define certain schools not covered by the legisla-
tion could be problematic. Under this definition the IRS will be required
to determine whether a particular school's curriculum is exclusively reli-
gious, a determination that will necessarily involve the IRS in the consti-
tutional dilemma of evaluating the religious nature of a school's curricu-
lum. At many schools, in addition to seminaries and Sunday schools,
religion permeates the entire curriculum. The use of an exclusively reli-
gious test inevitably will lead to controversies between such schools and
the IRS, and, therefore, the legislation will be difficult to administer.
The proposed legislation does not establish clearly the kind of dis-
crimination being addressed. The use of an effects standard potentially
would have a far greater impact on the operations of private schools than
would an intent standard. The standard to be applied should be ad-
dressed squarely in such legislation.
One final note, the proposed legislation, as doeg Revenue Procedure
75-50, would deny exempt status for discrimination based on color and
national origin. To develop a legitimate position on the legislation, this
factor and indeed all others previously mentioned will have to be given
the utmost consideration.
